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ABSTRACT The coronavirus (COVID-19) has appeared as the greatest challenge due to its continuous 
structural evolution as well as the absence of proper antidotes for this particular virus. The virus mainly 
spreads and replicates itself among mass people through close contact which unfortunately can happen in 
many unpredictable ways. Therefore, to slow down the spread of this novel virus, the only relevant initiatives 
are to maintain social distance, perform contact tracing, use proper safety gears, and impose quarantine 
measures. But despite being theoretically possible, these approaches are very difficult to uphold in densely 
populated countries and areas. Therefore, to control the virus spread, researchers and authorities are 
considering the use of smartphone based mobile applications (apps) to identify the likely infected persons as 
well as the highly risky zones to maintain isolation and lockdown measures. However, these methods heavily 
depend on advanced technological features and expose significant privacy loopholes. In this paper, we 
propose a new method for COVID-19 contact tracing based on mobile phone users’ geolocation data. The 
proposed method will help the authorities to identify the number of probable infected persons without using 
smartphone based mobile applications. In addition, the proposed method can help people take the vital 
decision of when to seek medical assistance by letting them know whether they are already in the list of 
exposed persons. Numerical examples demonstrate that the proposed method can significantly outperform 
the smartphone app-based solutions.  
INDEX TERMS Coronavirus, Covid-19, Contact Tracing, Geolocation, Pandemic. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since World War II, the coronavirus (COVID-19) is being 
considered to be the most life-threatening event that 
happened in the history of mankind. It is a new family of 
coronavirus that changes its RNA structure frequently. As 
the virus had spread all on a sudden and the spread rate could 
not be predicted in prior, only a few countries have been able 
to control the penetration of this virus. The main reason 
behind their successful control was the ability to trace the 
contacts of the infected persons promptly and put them into 
isolation [1]. To slow down the coronavirus spread, three 
measures have been proven effective: i) contact tracing, ii) 
social distancing, and iii) quarantine. In particular, contact 
tracing plays a leading role in containing the spread when the 
R-value is below 1.0. Since the outbreak began, different 
countries adopted different types of contract tracing 
strategies based on their socio-economic conditions. A vast 
majority of these methods operate through smartphone-
based mobile apps.  
      According to the statistical portal, it has been found that 
in 2019 almost 5.07 billion people in the world are using 
mobile phones as a medium of communication and an 
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estimated 67% of the world population has a mobile phone. 
The statistics also reports that in 2014 the smartphone users 
were around 38% which increased to 50% by the end of 2018 
[2]. It has been reported that the number of smartphone users 
worldwide today surpasses three billion [2]. From this 
growth, it is expected that the number of smartphone users 
will grow by one billion in a period of five years [3], [4]. 
Therefore, contact tracing can be easily done using mobile 
phone apps but the challenge is how the collected data can 
be handled securely and what information should be 
collected [5]. In addition, people’s willingness to install the 
apps as well as the availability of smartphones in all areas of 
a society is also a major challenge. According to Ferretti et 
al. [6], [7], if 60% of the population of a country install the 
contact tracing app, the spread rate will automatically slow 
down. After collecting the data, the next obvious question is 
how to warn people effectively. Many approaches are now 
under consideration such as contact tracing, narrowcasting, 
broadcasting, and so on to alert people regarding the 
possibility of being infected or tracing the likely infected 
person's contact trajectory [8]. Accurate contact tracing data 
is vital for providing timely exposure notices. For that 
purpose, users’ personal information such as mobility, 
details of the persons the suspected user contacted, etc. has 
to be disclosed. The app can provide the data with reliable 
accuracy only if the collected information is sufficient. But 
more information leads to increased breach of privacy which 
is a major concern these days.  
        For a clear understanding of the privacy concerns 
related to smartphone app-based contact tracing, one needs 
to know how such apps operate in practice. A typical contact 
tracing app works as follows: the app should be installed on 
an individual’s cell phone and the Bluetooth of the phone 
must always remain on. When two users, having the same 
app installed, reach in close proximity, the app exchanges a 
unique identifier using Bluetooth which is stored either in the 
phone storage or in a centralized database. If a person is 
found to be COVID-19 positive, his mobile is taken to collect 
all the mobile numbers that had so far been stored in this 
mobile, and then those persons are informed as soon as 
possible. However, the authors in [9] raised some valid 
questions regarding the method being used in the Bluetooth-
based contact tracing app, such as, how the anonymity of a 
user be protected from the app provider, how to prevent the 
snooper to access individual’s data through this app, what 
measure the authority will take in case of contacted persons 
after knowing their details and so on. Therefore, not only 
finding the infected or likely infected person is enough but 
how to inform them or what measures should be taken to 
confine them is also important in the pandemic situation. In 
addition, solutions that seem effective for some countries 
may not be appropriate for other countries due to different 
social norms. 
       To address the aforementioned challenges in 
smartphone app-based contact tracing of COVID-19, we 
propose the idea of using mobile phone users’ geolocation 
data for contact tracing. The proposed model does not require 
Bluetooth/Wi-Fi/NFC enabled cell phones since the 
responsible authorities will collect the data directly from the 
network providers. The procedure is detailed in the following 
sections. 
Meanwhile, the rest of the paper is organized as follows: 
Section II presents an extensive review of existing systems, 
Section III focuses on the details the proposed model, Section 
IV compares the proposed model with existing systems from 
different viewpoints, then, experimental results are presented 
in section V. Finally, conclusions are drawn in section VI. 
II. REVIEW OF EXISTING SYSTEMS 
After the declaration of WHO as COVID-19 outbreak a 
public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC) 
on 30th January 2020 [10, 11] and a pandemic on 11th March 
2020 [12], many countries developed different contact 
tracing apps to monitor and control the spread in the country. 
According to a CNN report, the Health Code app [13] that is 
being used in many parts of China works as follows: the app 
asks people about their symptom as well as their travel 
history, the possibility of being in contact with a COVID-19 
positive patient, their workplaces, residential addresses, 
phone numbers, passport numbers, national identity number, 
etc. will be verified. After verification, a color code will be 
sent to the person’s mobile phone named as “QR Code” 
whose color can be either red, green or amber. Users with red 
code will have to go under government quarantine or self-
quarantine for 14 days, users with amber code will go to 
quarantine for 7 days but users with green code are 
considered to be risk-free. The major problem in this app is 
if a person intentionally provides wrong information 
regarding his travel information or symptom or being in 
close contact with a COVID-19 positive patient, then he will 
get a green code and will likely affect more people before 
being identified. 
South Korea was among the first few countries that were 
affected by the novel coronavirus after China. Hence, in 
South Korea, the first confirmed cases were reported on 20th 
January 2020 [14]. Even though in the initial stage the 
number of affected people in South Korea was quite high but 
they didn’t go for any lockdown or roadblock or aggressive 
immigration control strategy. Rather they used a trace, test, 
and treat strategy which proved very effective as within a 
short period the curve of newly confirmed cases, as well as 
deaths, had been flattened at around mid-March [15]. To 
control the spreading, the Government of South Korea sent 
all the travelers who came from abroad into self-quarantine. 
During the quarantine state, the travelers forcefully used a 
self-diagnosis app and updated their health status regularly 
so that the Government can trace whether there are any 
suspected symptoms [16]. At the same time, the government 
also sent all of the individuals who had direct contact with 
those travelers to self-quarantine as well and followed the 
same monitoring scheme. But the main problem in this 
tracing process arose when the collected data was shared 
among many authorities such as police, health insurance, 
central government agencies, health care professionals, 
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health care associations, and others. Hence, it is a direct 
violation of data privacy law in South Korea [15]. But during 
the pandemic situation, such law can be relaxed and that was 
what South Korea did at that time. Besides, it was suggested 
that if such a situation happens again, aggregated data rather 
than an individual’s can be shared to all the concerned 
sectors to control the misuse of data [15]. 
In March 2020, Singapore Ministry of Health first 
released a contact tracing app called “TraceTogether” and its 
BLE-based protocol BlueTrace [17] where the tracing will 
be done through mobile phones’ Bluetooth technology. For 
tracking purpose, a person has to install the app, and 
Bluetooth must be turned on always. A unique token is 
generated in the person’s mobile during installation. 
Whenever two persons are in close proximity their phone 
will exchange that token through Bluetooth and preserve that 
token number in the phone storage [18]. 
The Pan-European Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing 
(PEPP-PT) [19], a joint project between Germany, France 
and Italy, proposed a centralized data center based on 
Bluetooth low energy (BLE)-based tracing technique where 
any traveler travelling within EU countries can use the same 
app to let the government know his contacted persons’ list 
without needing any additional contact tracing app. 
There are several major problems in the BLE-based 
tracing systems following both centralized and decentralized 
approaches. First, if the person does not use a smartphone 
featuring Bluetooth connectivity, then there is no way he or 
she can be traced. We acknowledge that in a first world 
country like Singapore or Germany, most of the people use 
smartphones but not necessarily everyone keeps the 
Bluetooth connectivity enabled in his/her device at all time. 
Second, although Bluetooth technology is considered as a 
cheap, reliable, and low power consuming option, any 
malicious user may access the information stored in the 
mobile devices through the Bluetooth link [20, 21, 22]. In 
[21], Naveed et al. explained the security issues of using 
mobile Bluetooth technology for android devices and in [23] 
the authors showed the security issues in the iOS platform. 
Data privacy is thus a major concern in Bluetooth based 
apps.  For any contact tracing app, the main goal is to inform 
the person that he or she has been exposed to the virus. 
However, with Bluetooth-based apps, even if the person has 
not been in touch with any infected person but within the 
Bluetooth range of the person, the user of the phone will be 
flagged as a suspected one and may be subject to social 
bullying. It may also create a mass confusion if the number 
of such false alarm increases significantly. On the other 
hand, if we consider the scenario of a developing country like 
Bangladesh, Nigeria etc., where coronavirus is creating 
phobia among people as medical facilities to support the 
massive number of patients are not adequate and many 
hospitals are not even treating patients with other problems 
due to the suspicion of coronavirus, this type of contract 
tracing app will create mass panic rather than mass 
awareness and people will face social harassment. 
In general, two types of data can be collected by using 
these apps, one is “proximity” which will show with whom 
the user has been in contact and “location” which will show 
in which area the user has roamed [8]. Both may cause false 
positive alarms and false-negative alarms [8]. A false-
positive alarm will happen if the person who is identified 
being in contact either by location information or contact 
information may just pass the area at that time and didn’t 
even come in direct contact with the infected person. A false-
negative alarm means the app is failing to identify any 
suspected person which may happen due to many reasons as 
we have discussed earlier. 
Interestingly, many existing works suggest decentralized 
solutions because less sensitive data can then be shared with 
central authorities and thus the end user’s privacy can be 
preserved [24, 25]. However, the risk of the decentralized 
solution compared to the centralized solution is still a trade-
off and beyond the scope of this work. 
While most of the contact tracing apps are now using the 
BLE-based tracing technique, some researchers are also 
thinking about storing user’s mobility information and only 
hand over this information only when found COVID-19 
positive [26]. In terms of data security and privacy, this is 
more secure as logging the location without the contact’s 
stored information is less private.  
In [27], the authors proposed a Bluetooth based contact tracing 
app “CONTAIN” where they showed that the identity of the 
user will be completely anonymous and at the same time, they 
experimented different timing of turning the Bluetooth on 
(random, decentralized, centralized) of the mobile to compare 
the results. They found in their experimental results that even 
if the Bluetooth is turned on, only when the user goes to any 
public gathering, the performance of the app is better than if it 
is turned on randomly during different times of the day. 
FIGURE 1.  Contact tracing through cell phone network using 
geolocation data. 
We have found that most of the COVID-19 contact tracing 
apps released so far are based on location/ proximity-based 
contact tracing, location-based hotspot reporting, and self-
reported symptom tracking [17, 19, 24-33]. On the other 
hand, if the location data can be obtained from cellular 
mobile phone networks, then the issues related to the BLE-
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based tracing technique can be eliminated as well as the 
technological requirements (e.g. phones with Bluetooth and 
smart features) can be waived. The authors of [34] have 
proposed an outdoor location tracking technique of mobile 
devices in a cellular network. They have shown that the 
proposed technique is nearly 88% accurate. In urban areas, 
the tracking performance is the best with median accuracies 
of up to 112m. It is also found that the cellular systems show 
promising positioning performance in indoor environments 
as well [35]. 
In this paper, we propose a contact tracing approach using 
cellular sim card geolocation data as opposed to the BLE-
based tracing techniques. In the proposed model, a 
confirmed COVID19 patient’s mobile number will be passed 
to the corresponding mobile operator to find its mobility 
information for the past 7 days. The operator will use the 
geolocation information to trace the mobility as shown in 
Fig.1.  
In the proposed model, no Bluetooth/ Wi-Fi/ NFC enabled 
cell phone is needed as the operator will use the geolocation-
based tracing approach by getting the location data directly 
from the base station to identify the likely infected persons. 
This method can avoid panic spread among people as it does 
not require continuous warning about their possibility of 
getting infected. The responsible authority can then identify 
the riskiest persons based on the intensity of contact with 
Covid-19 positive patients and instruct them to go for 
isolation/test if necessary. In addition, if a person feels to have 
developed any symptoms of COVID-19, the proposed method 
can also perform an initial screening by checking whether the 
cell phone number is enlisted in the list of suspects. 
III. PROPOSED CONTACT TRACING MODEL 
In this section, we present the proposed cell phone 
geolocation-based contact tracing model. We structure the 
overall framework in three operational phases. Each phase has 
specific activities. The phases and their operations are 
discussed below. 
A. PHASE – I: Data Collection 
In this phase, the primary data for the COVID-19 patients will 
be collected from the designated test centers. Then the infected 
areas will be shown using any map services (e.g. Google map). 
The activities to be performed at this stage are described below 
and the process is depicted in Fig. 2. 
1) STEP 01 
Whenever a person visits a COVID-19 test center, two basic 
information, such as the current address and the active 
mobile phone number(s) must be recorded in the local 
register of the test center. 
2) STEP 02 
If the person is found to be COVID-19 positive, then the 
previously recorded information (i.e. address and phone 
numbers) must be reported to the central database. 
3) STEP 03 
At this point, the number of infected persons in an individual 
area (e.g. Division, District, City, Road, etc.) will be 
calculated. 
4) STEP 04 
An application will be in place (e.g. iOS or Android App, or 
Web Application, etc.) where anyone can do a simple 
registration with the mobile number. The registered user can 
search for a particular location and get the number of infected 
persons around it via any map services (e.g. Google map). 
B. PHASE – II: Identifying Probable Occurrences 
In the second phase, we focus on how the Government can 
identify the likely infected persons. The cell phone number 
of the Covid-19 positive patients can be traced to find out the 
possible occurrences as shown in Fig. 3. Here, any other cell 
phone user who came in near proximity (e.g. 2 meters) to the 
infected person during the last 7 days lies in the suspected 
list. But the mass people do not need to install any kind of 
application as the location data (latitude and longitude) will 
be collected from the cell phone network. Therefore, this 
process is not limited to the use of smart phones, rather we 
can get the data for any type of cell phone (e.g. feature 
phone) users. The step-by-step process is illustrated below, 
and the process is depicted in Fig. 4. 
1) STEP 01 
After getting the data (i.e. the list of infected persons) from 
the central database, each mobile number will be sent to the 
corresponding mobile operator to get the mobility 
information (latitude and longitude) of the respective cell 
phone users during the prior 7 days. At the same time, the 
operator will also be asked to provide the mobile numbers of 
the active cell phone users within those infected persons’ 
mobility zones within a given distance. 
2) STEP 02 
The mobility zone information, acquired from the previous 
 
FIGURE 2.  Flow diagram of Phase - I 
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step, will then be sent to all other operators to identify all of 
the active cell phone users inside the zone at that time. 
3) STEP 03 
All the cell phone numbers (obtained from step 1 and 2) will 
be stored in the central database marked as “possible infected 
cell phone numbers”. 
4) STEP 04 
Step 04: If a particular number is found to appear multiple 
times in the “possible infected cell phone numbers” list, then 
those cell phone users will be instructed to go for isolation/ 
COVID-19 test as appropriate. 
C. PHASE – III: User’s Query 
At this phase, if a person feels physically uncomfortable and 
wants to go for a test, the application can help to make the 
decision and predict the intensity. For this purpose, we 
propose activities as follows in stepwise and the process is 
depicted in Fig. 5. 
1) STEP 01 
Through the application, any person can search whether the 
corresponding cell phone number is enlisted in the suspected 
list. 
2) STEP 02 
If the cell phone user is already suspected by the application, 
the person will be instructed to answer some questionnaires 
which can be taken from [36, 37, 38]. The sample question 
set is shown in Table 1. 
3) STEP 03 
The answers will be verified and analyzed in real-time with 
a predefined answer set. 
4) STEP 04 
Finally, after the analysis, if the person is found to be 
possibly infected then the person will be instructed to go for 
a COVID-19 test. 
These three phases are combined to form the proposed contact 
tracing method and the overall flow is depicted in Fig. 6. 
 
TABLE I 
SAMPLE QUESTIONNAIRE 
Sample Questions 
User Options 
Option-1 Option-2 
1. New or worsening cough Yes No 
2. Shortness of breath Yes No 
3. Sore throat Yes No 
4. Runny nose, Sneezing or nasal 
congestion Yes No 
5. Hoarse Voice Yes No 
6. Difficulty Swelling Yes No 
7. Nausea/vomiting/diarrhea/abdominal 
pain Yes No 
8. Unexpected fatigue Yes No 
9. Fever Yes No 
 
FIGURE. 3.  Finding possible occurrences using geolocation data from mobile phone operators. 
 
FIGURE 4.  Flow diagram of Phase - II 
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IV. COMPARISON WITH OTHER SOLUTIONS 
The strongest aspect of the proposed contact tracing method 
is that it is not limited by advanced technological 
requirements (e.g. Smartphone, Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, NFC, and 
so on). The only requirement is that every individual has to 
carry the cell phone with an active sim card. With 5.112 
billion unique mobile users, 67% penetration globally (even 
higher in urban areas where COVID-19 has the worst effect), 
mobile phone geolocation data seems to be the most viable 
means of contact tracing. Recently, a few articles have 
summarized different approaches proposed in the literature 
for minimizing the spread during this outbreak of COVID-
19 [39], [40]. Most of the approaches are modern technology 
facilitated. The common approaches are broadcasting, 
selective broadcasting, unicasting, participatory sharing, 
private kit: safe paths, etc. Each of these approaches has its 
strengths and limitations. Raskar et al. have provided a 
detailed summary of the approaches named above [39]. We 
have reviewed the detailed comparison presented in [39] and 
analyzed different aspects of each method. The comparison 
of strengths and limitations of existing and the proposed 
methods is outlined in Table 2. The comparison factors are 
illustrated below as per the proposed model: 
A. ACCURACY 
As the mobility information will be collected from the 
mobile operators, it is obvious that the data will be accurate. 
In the proposed model, we will not collect the locations 
verbally. As a result, we can say that the data will be precise 
and accurate.   
B. ADOPTION 
There will be no adaptability issue as the person does not 
need to carry out any predefined activity. People will 
continue their day-to-day activities, and what everybody 
does most of the time, they will carry their cell phones. 
C. PRIVACY 
The privacy issues are considered in the viewpoints of 
carriers, local businesses, users of the proposed model, and 
the non-users. These issues are discussed below: 
 
 
 
FIGURE 5.  Flow diagram of Phase - III 
 
FIGURE 6.  Overall Flow diagram of the proposed system 
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1) PRIVACY RISK FOR CARRIERS 
There will be no privacy risks for the carriers as the personal 
information will not be publicized. Only the infected count 
will be made public via any map services (e.g. Google map). 
While identifying the adjacent persons of a particular cell 
phone user, the location information will not be made public 
also because the proposed model works in a centralized 
manner. The location data will be used only for predicting 
infection probability of the respective user. 
2) PRIVACY RISK FOR LOCAL BUSINESS 
There will be very low privacy risks for the local businesses 
as the locations where the carrier visited will not be made 
public. 
3) PRIVACY RISK FOR USERS 
The privacy of the users will be protected as the application 
will collect the location data from the sim card operator, not 
from the device location through Bluetooth or other means. 
4) PRIVACY RISK FOR NON-USERS 
There may be privacy violations for the non-users as the 
users and non-users are somehow connected via social 
relationships, but this is common for other contact tracing 
methods as well. When a person is diagnosed as COVID-19 
positive, the family members or friends may endure the same 
unintended consequences of the event. 
D. CONSENT 
The consent issues are considered in terms of the carriers, 
businesses and users of the proposed model. These issues are 
illustrated below: 
1) CONSENT OF CARRIERS 
The proposed model is considered to operate in such a way 
where the information about the patients will be recorded 
before the test of COVID-19. As a result, there will be no 
way to hide the details of the carrier afterward. Therefore, no 
consent will be needed as it is a casual and normal practice. 
2) CONSENT OF LOCAL BUSINESSES 
The consent of local businesses in the proposed model 
mainly depends on the Government policies. 
3) CONSENT OF USERS 
The consent of the users is required for the proposed model. 
During the registration, the user will be asked to provide the 
cell phone number. Even when the user wants to check if 
he/she made any contact with any COVID-19 patient, the cell 
phone number needs to be sent to the operator for a cross-
check.    
E. SYSTEMATIC CHALLENGES 
The systematic challenges are considered in terms of 
carriers, businesses, and users of the proposed model. The 
issues are described below: 
1) MISINFORMATION 
There is a very low risk of misinformation as the location 
data will not be taken from any user input. Rather the data 
will be collected from the sim card operator. 
2) PANIC 
The proposed model can reduce panic to some extent as the 
users of the model can check the initial status and also the 
intensity while staying at home. 
 
TABLE II 
STRENGTH AND LIMITATION ANALYSIS WITH OTHER PROPOSED METHODS 
Models  Major Strengths  Major Limitations 
Broadcast • No public adoption issues. 
• User's privacy is protected. 
• Mostly accessible by all. 
• Significant privacy risk 
for COVID-19 carriers. 
• Data accuracy issue. 
• High risk of 
misinformation and 
mass panic. 
Selective 
Broadcast 
• Moderate privacy risk for 
COVID-19 carriers. 
• Mass panic may be 
limited. 
• Data accuracy issue. 
• Risk of misinformation. 
• Limited by technological 
requirements 
Unicast • Low risk of mass panic. 
• Data accuracy is high. 
 
• No privacy for the user 
• Not helpful for the mass 
people. 
Participatory • User's privacy is 
protected from mass 
people. 
• There can be fraudulent 
activity. 
• Mass user adoption is 
low. 
• Full consent is needed 
from the COVID-19 
carrier. 
Private Kit: 
Safe Path 
• Overall accuracy is high. 
• Moderate to low privacy 
risk for the COVID-19 
carrier. 
 
• Limited by technological 
requirements 
• Full consent is required 
from the COVID-19 
carrier. 
Proposed 
Solution 
• High accuracy of location 
data. 
• Users' cell phones must 
not be smartphones rather 
any phone with an active 
sim card. 
• To collect the data, no 
user application is 
needed. 
• Less false negative issue. 
• The user has to carry the 
cell phone. 
3) FRAUD AND ABUSE 
It is expected that there will be no fraudulent activities as the 
application will not require any open connection (e.g. 
Bluetooth, NFC, etc.). 
4) SECURITY OF INFORMATION 
The proposed model is designed with a view in mind about 
the security concerns of the carrier’s as well as the user’s 
important information. As only the cell phone number, 
which is already a public entity, is needed to operate the 
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proposed method, there is a very low chance of security 
holes. 
5) EQUAL ACCESS 
Equal access is the main strength of the proposed model as it 
is not limited by any technological requirement (e.g. 
smartphones, battery, certain OS, etc.) rather only a cell 
phone is needed. 
6) SOCIOECONOMIC FACTORS 
There are almost no bad impacts on the socioeconomic 
factors for the proposed model. Sometimes it is dependent 
on the government's practice if there is any.  
 
Finally, the overall comparison of existing contact tracing 
approaches with the proposed approach is provided in Table 
II in terms of major strengths and limitations. 
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
In this section, we compare the proposed contact tracing 
method with existing technologies through numerical 
examples. To understand the real impact of our proposed 
system and to make a realistic comparison with the existing 
solutions based on BLE technology, we have generated the 
mimic of an actual contact tracing scenario based on some 
real statistical measures. In the scenario, we have used the 
Poisson Point Process (PPP) for a circular area of radius 1. 
We have scaled a distance of 100 meters to unity for ease of 
presentation. The percentages of smartphone users and any 
type of mobile phone users are considered as the density 
parameters of PPP for generating two separate sets of data.  
We consider Bangladesh as a typical example of developing 
countries to show the practical effectiveness of the proposed 
approach. According to the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics 
(BBS) and Bangladesh Statistics 2018, the total population of 
Bangladesh is 162.7 Million [41]. According to the 
Bangladesh Telecommunication Regulatory Commission 
(BTRC), the total number of mobile phone subscribers is 
162.290 million [42] and the total number of mobile Internet 
subscribers is 93.101 million at the end of April 2020 [43]. As 
the total number of mobile phone subscribers is almost 
identical to the total population, we assume that almost 100% 
people have a mobile phone of some kind. Note that the 
official data of unique mobile users is not available during this 
analysis. We are considering the percentage of smartphone 
users based on the total number of mobile Internet subscribers. 
Thus, we can say that almost 58% of Bangladeshi people are 
using smartphones. Without loss of generality, we assume that 
people need smartphones to be able to use the BLE-based 
tracing app.  
Now, we use the value of the density parameter for any type 
of mobile phone users as l = 100 and for smartphone users as 
l = 58 in Poisson Point Process. Based on this assumption, we 
simulate the data for both type of mobile phone users in 
Cartesian two-dimensional space. We have repeated the 
simulation four times so that we can make a reliable inference 
with a more accurate performance measure. In order to 
understand the dispersion of the points, we use scatter plots 
(Figs. 7 and 8) and covariance measures. 
 
FIGURE 7.  Scatter Plots (four trials) using Poisson Point Process (l= 
58). 
 
FIGURE 8.  Scatter Plots (four trials) using Poisson Point Process (l= 
100). 
 
TABLE III 
COVARIANCE ANALYSIS OF THE GENERATED POINTS USING POISSON POINT 
PROCESS 
Trial l = 58 l = 100 
T-1 0.00634 0.002947 
T-2 0.01175 0.009763 
T-3 0.024061 0.00306 
T-4 0.00859 0.00582 
 
     It is apparent that the points in any type of mobile phone 
users (Fig. 8) are more condensed than the points simulated 
based on only smartphone users (Fig. 7). The covariance 
analysis in Table III is also supporting this observation to draw 
the same inference as the covariance is always smaller for the 
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points in any type of mobile phone users (l = 100) than 
smartphone users (l = 58). 
     According to the official statistics, 18% of the people who 
were tested for COVID-19 in Bangladesh were found positive 
[44]. So, we have randomly selected 18% of the points as 
COVID-19 positive and marked with red dots in Fig. 7 and 
Fig. 8. Then, we have measured the Euclidian distance of 
every point with respect to the red points (likely COVID-19 
positive). Finally, we have counted the points which were 
within a 3-meter radius of any of the Covid-19 positive points. 
Similarly, we count the same considering the 2-meter 
distancing strategy. The contact tracing performance 
comparison for a maximum of 3-meter distance is shown in 
Table IV. Here, we can see that for each of the four trials, the 
count of contact tracing using any type of mobile phone is 
higher than that of smartphone users. During the trials, the 
highest percentage of change with respect to smartphone users 
is 300% and the lowest is 100%. The average count of contact 
tracing for any type of mobile phone users and smartphone 
users is 20 and 7.75, respectively. These observations clearly 
show the effectiveness of the proposed tracing strategy. 
   
 
TABLE IV 
CONTACT TRACING COMPARISON FOR MAXIMUM 3-METER DISTANCE 
Trial 
Contact Tracing Count Percentage of change 
with respect to the only 
Smartphone user 
For any type of 
Mobile Phone 
user 
For Smartphone 
user only 
T-1 19 9 111.11 % 
T-2 22 11 100 % 
T-3 19 6 216.67 % 
T-4 20 5 300 % 
 
      The contact tracing comparison for a maximum of 2-meter 
distance is shown in Table V, where we again notice that for 
each trial, the count of contact tracing using any type of mobile 
phone is higher than that of smartphone users. During the 
trials, the highest percentage of change with respect to 
smartphone users is 266.67% and the lowest is 60%. The 
average count of contact tracing for any type of mobile phone 
users and smartphone users is 9.5 and 4.25, respectively. 
 
TABLE V 
CONTACT TRACING COMPARISON FOR MAXIMUM 2-METER DISTANCE 
Trial 
Contact Tracing Count Percentage of change 
with respect to the only 
Smartphone user 
For any type of 
Mobile Phone 
user 
For Smartphone 
user only 
T-1 9 5 80 % 
T-2 10 4 150 % 
T-3 8 5 60 % 
T-4 11 3 266.67 % 
 
These two contact tracing comparisons are depicted 
graphically in Fig. 9 and Fig. 10. 
FIGURE 9.  Pairwise contact tracing comparison considering the 
maximum 3-meter distance. 
 
FIGURE 10.  Pairwise contact tracing comparison considering the 
maximum 2-meter distance. 
 
       Next, we extend the performance comparison to the case 
of two other countries, e.g. India and South Korea because 
South Korea is ranked at the top of the list for smartphone 
usage (95%) and India at the last (24%) based on the total 
population [45]. In India, 24% of the total population use 
smartphones, 40% people use mobile phones that are not 
smartphones and 35% people do not use any mobile phone at 
all. Therefore, we simulate the data for India with the density 
parameter, l = 24 for smartphone-only users and l = 64 for 
any kind of mobile phone users. On the other hand, in South 
Korea, 95% people use smartphones and 5% use a mobile 
phone that are not smartphones. So, for South Korea, we 
consider the density parameter, l = 95 for smartphone-only 
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users and l = 100 for any kind of mobile phone users. 
According to COVID-19 case statistics for both the countries, 
it is found that in India, 4.16 % of people were found positive 
after test [46] and it is 1.06 % in South Korea [47]. We have 
used these percentages to consider the COVID-19 positive 
points. The country-wise contact tracing performance of 
existing and proposed schemes is shown in Fig. 11.  
FIGURE 11.  Country wise average contact tracing count comparison. 
 
       From Fig.11, it is noticeable that the count of contact 
tracing is higher for most of the time when any type of mobile 
phone users’ geolocation is considered than smartphone-based 
apps. The percentage of changes with respect to smartphone 
users for each of the countries is also given in Fig. 12. 
FIGURE 12.  Country wise comparison on percentage of change with 
respect to only smartphone users 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
To slow down the spreading of the deadly virus termed as the 
novel Coronavirus, there is no alternative to finding out the 
infected persons as well as those who came into close contact 
with an infected person, then taking proper measures. 
Considering this fundamental approach, many countries have 
already developed contact tracing applications which are 
showing promising results but with significant privacy 
concerns. In this paper, we have addressed the privacy issue 
by avoiding any smartphone-based apps for contact tracing 
through wireless connectivity (e.g. Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, NFC, 
etc.). The proposed model uses mobile users’ geolocation data 
directly from the mobile operators. By doing so the overall 
contact tracing performance improves significantly while 
preserving users’ privacy.  
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